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Some Bases for Remittitur in Personal
Injury Cases
Robert Saxer*
N REVIEWING AN AWARD by a jury the court must consider
various factors before it can determine whether the award is
so excessive that remittitur should be granted or a new trial
ordered. Remittitur is justified when the award is based on com-
putation errors, oversight or consideration of an improper ele-
ment, or when, in view of the evidence, the judgment is exces-
sive enough to indicate prejudice, passion, partiality or corrup-
tion on the part of the jury.'
The Ohio Revised Code, Section 2321.17, states, typically of
such statutes:
A final order, judgment or decree shall be vacated and a new
trial granted by the trial court on the application of a party
aggrieved [sub. D] where the damages are excessive and
appear to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
This rule gives the court no alternative but to set aside the ver-
dict and grant a new trial when passion or prejudice is involved.2
There are no absolute rules for deciding whether damages
are excessive and the court must determine from the circum-
stances of the case whether the verdict is the result of bias, prej-
udice or gross overestimation.3 However, when the amount
awarded is sustained by the evidence and within the range of
just compensation for such difficult to determine items as per-
sonal injuries and pain and suffering, the verdict rendered should
not be disturbed.4 The court should consider the nature and ex-
tent of injuries, future discomfort and suffering, expenses and
loss of earnings already incurred, and future loss of earnings and
expenses. The plaintiff's age, life expectancy, and trade or pro-
fession should count in evaluating the verdict. 5 The court should
* B.S., Kent State Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 25A C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 196 (1966); Oleck, Damages to Persons &
Property, Sec. 152 (1961 rev. ed.); Oleck, Cases on Damages, c. 8 (1962).
2 40 Ohio Jur. 2d 576 (1959).
3 Op. cit. supra note 1.
4 Weeks v. Hyatt, 346 Mich. 479, 78 N. W. 2d 260 (1956); op. cit. supra note 1.
5 16 Ohio Jur. 2d 337 (1955).
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not substitute its judgment for the jury's unless the verdict lacks
the support of evidence or is clearly excessive. 6 The court is not
limited to considering the above factors but may also consider
mortification and embarrassment, "phantom" pains,7 and loss of
consortium.'
The order of the court requiring a remittitur within a speci-
fied period is not conclusively binding on the plaintiff, as he may
elect to go through another trial rather than accept the reduced
amount.9 The mere suggestion that the plaintiff accept a reduced
verdict to avoid further litigation is not a finding that the verdict
was excessive nor does it indicate that the judge abused his dis-
cretion by not demanding a remittitur.10
Generally, where passion and prejudice are involved in the
verdict, a new trial must be granted because there is no basis for
remittitur when the defendant did not have a fair trial. How-
ever, where the trial court judge does not indicate the basis for
the remittitur, the appeals court must decide from the trial rec-
ord whether there were grounds to support a remititur. Where
none are shown, the remittitur will be denied and the jury ver-
dict reinstated."
The court should not insert its judgment of the evidence in
place of the jury verdict. In an action for a whiplash injury a
judge ordered a remittitur of $10,000 without stating justification.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said that the evidence sup-
ported the entire award. A trial judge's opinion carries great
weight, because he sees the entire proceedings, but he still must
state the basis of his decision or he has abused his discretion
when the trial record does not openly support his action.'2
The recent trend in awarding remittitur has been to allow
a reasonable award and not the lowest possible amount.
13
The best method of understanding how remittitur is deter-
mined is to analyze pertinent cases and see what principles of
damages are emphasized.
6 Kazdin v. Cooley, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 484 (1940).
7 Hubbard v. The Long Island Railroad Co., 152 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. N. Y.
1957); 21 N. A. C. C. A. L. J. 256 (1958).
8 Gleason v. Cunningham, 316 Ill. App. 286, 44 N. E. 2d 940 (1942).
9 Elliott v. Sherman, 147 Me. 317, 87 A. 2d 504 (1952).
10 Rea v. Simowitz, 226 No. Car. 379, 38 S. E. 2d 194 (1946).
11 Majewski v. Nowicki, 364 Mich. 698, 111 N. W. 2d 887 (1961).
12 Millay v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 19 Wis. 2d 330,
120 N. W. 2d 103 (1963).
13 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N. W. 2d 393 (1960).
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A 70-year old woman suffered serious injuries in a train
accident which left her an invalid for the rest of her life. She
had $2,700 in medical bills and a future operation would cost
$1,200. A housemaid would charge $8 a day; the plaintiff had
a life expectancy of 12 years; she had no earning power; her pain
was severe. The jury granted her $37,900 for past and future
expenses and $38,600 for pain and suffering. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma felt that the size of the award indicated the jury
was in part motivated by passion and prejudice, and ordered a
remittitur of $26,500. Oklahoma is one of the few states where
passion and prejudice do not necessarily require the grant of a
new trial.14
In an auto accident involving a whiplash injury, the jury
awarded the plaintiff-housewife $10,000. The plaintiff had $250
in medical bills, spent 21/2 months in bed and suffered pain for
7 months. The trial court ordered a remittitur of $4,000 and the
defendant appealed on the grounds that the award was excessive
and the result of passion and prejudice. The appeals court held
there was a proper basis for the award and that the verdict must
be greatly excessive before it can be traced to passion and preju-
dice. A $4,000 remittitur does not show that passion and preju-
dice were involved. 15
In another injury case the appeals court felt that a $30,000
remittitur was not sufficient correction of the verdict where the
actions of the plaintiff on the witness stand inflamed the jury.
A new trial was ordered.16
Injuries to minors generally involve higher awards due to
their longer life expectancy, but remittiturs are frequently in-
volved. In one case a child received a non-permanent back
injury in a railroad accident, and the court ordered a $5,000
diminution of the $12,500 award, based on comparison with sim-
ilar awards given in the past.17 In another railroad case a men-
tally retarded, epileptic child lost both legs and was awarded
$225,000; the court ordered a $60,000 reduction. The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the remittitur and increased it to
$90,000. The reason for lowering the award was comparison of
the award with other cases which involved different age groups
14 St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Fox, 359 P. 2d 710 (Okl. 1961).
15 Gleason v. Cunningham, 316 Ill. App. 286, 44 N. E. 2d 940 (1942).
16 Stephens v. Chicago Transit Authority, 28 Ill. App. 2d 229, 171 N. E. 2d
229 (1960).
17 Williams v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S. W. 2d 1 (1950).
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and work capabilities.1 8 A similar case occurred one year later
involving a 16-year old child of above average health and intelli-
gence, who became a quadraplegic as the result of a train acci-
dent. The previous case was cited as a basis for the remittitur
of $50,000 of a $270,000 award. The court held the plaintiff en-
titled to a higher award than in the previous case, because his
potential earnings would be larger and the pain and suffering
were more acutely realized by the more intelligent and healthier
child. 19
In an earlier case a woman had broken her ribs, legs and
nose. She suffered severe pain and had to use crutches for 13
months after the accident. The trial court granted a remittitur
of $10,000 and the defendant appealed, citing numerous similar
cases with lower awards. The appeals court reviewed the cases
and found that the particular circumstances involved justified
a $10,000 remittitur30
The importance of loss of future earnings is indicated in the
following case. The plaintiff suffered from low back pain and
had several scalp scars which were covered by hair. The trial
judge ordered a remittitur of $3,700 from an $8,000 judgment
to a plaintiff who had obtained a better job after the accident,
got married, and showed no anxiety or injury at the trial.21
A remittitur of $13,000 from a $20,000 award was granted in
an Ohio case; here the court stated that passion and prejudice
were not involved although % of the award was unreasonable.
The plaintiff was a seriously ill man who suffered from a severe
heart and liver condition. He was cut on the leg through the
negligence of the defendant, and the resulting infection hastened
his death. Medical testimony indicated that he had a life ex-
pectancy of 2 years when he died; he earned $60 a week when
able to work. The court held that the jury obviously believed
the plaintiff would have lived longer, and this did not indicate
passion or prejudice but only an error on the evidence. 22
18 Newman v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co., 369 S. W. 2d 583 (Mo.
1963).
19 Coffman v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co., 378 S. W. 2d 583 (Mo.
1964).
20 Easterly v. American Institute of Steel Construction, 340 Mo. 604, 162
S. W. 2d 825 (1942).
21 Lucas v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 17 Wis. 2d 568, 117
N. W. 2d 660 (1962).
22 Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Line Inc., 155 Ohio St. 207, 44 Ohio Op. 238,
98 N. E. 2d 419 (1951).
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In a Connecticut case, the Supreme Court of Errors stated
that future pain and suffering damages must be based on prob-
able suffering and not upon the conjecture that there was a 50%
chance of future pain and suffering. The court ordered a $2,000
return of a $5,800 reward. 23
Another court ordered a remittitur of $9,280 of a $15,280
verdict based on the evidence from the trial. The appeals court
stated that the trial court would be reversed only where an
abuse of discretion was involved. The trial court must review
the evidence in terms most favorable to the plaintiff. 24 Reason-
able damages fall anywhere between an unreasonable low or
high, and the $6000 award comes close to falling below the rea-
sonable minimum. This counters the trend the courts have
started towards allowing a reasonably high award in remittitur
cases. This remittitur was allowed reluctantly.25
In an award for injuries to two children, the trial court
granted a remittitur on awards to both children. The appeals
court declared that the reduction from $1,500 to $1,000 for the
broken leg of a 2-year old child was an abuse of discretion since
the amount awarded did not show excessiveness. However, the
reduction from $2,000 to $1,000 for a 3-year old child for oper-
able scars around the mouth was reasonable, and the amount
was substantial.26 In this case $500 was the difference between
reasonable and excessive awards.
Damages were itemized in the following case involving whip-
lash: past medical expenses-200; loss of wages-$82; present
pain and suffering-7,500; future medical expenses and pain
and suffering-5,000. The trial judge determined that no wages
were lost, prior medical costs were $125, and past and future
suffering and medical expenses would be $7,000. Injuries to a
hand and leg disappeared after six months, and the plaintiff had
occasional headaches and temporary pain on extreme exertion.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by lowering the award even though pas-
sion, prejudice or judicial error were not involved.2 7
23 Davis v. Gambardella and Son Cheese Corp., 147 Conn. 365, 161 A. 2d 583
(1960).
24 Kincannon v. National Indemnity Co., 5 Wis. 2d 231, 92 N. W. 2d 884
(1958).
25 Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 126 N. W. 2d 503 (1964).
26 Makowski v. Ehlenbach, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 103 N. W. 2d 907 (1960).
27 Richie v. Badger State Mutual Gas Co., 22 Wis. 2d 133, 125 N. W. 2d 381
(1963).
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In a rat poison case the plaintiff was hospitalized 20 days,
spent an additional 2 weeks at home, missed several months of
work, and 2 years later was experiencing some pain and suffer-
ing. An award of $20,000 shocked the conscience of the court but
a remittitur of $10,000 removed the shock.28
In a libel action the court ordered a remittitur of $50,000 on
a $100,000 award because the libel was distributed in only 50 or
60 written copies, and the jury was motivated by patriotic pas-
sion and prejudice.29
Several cases involve points limited in scope. Where the
plaintiff receives damages in excess of the ad damnum of the
writ, he may avoid a retrial by repaying the excess within 30
days.30 An award is not too excessive because it does not con-
sider any pension awarded in which the defendant had no
interest.31
In the following cases the awards were not considered ex-
cessive, and a review of them will help to give a balanced view
of remittitur.
A plaintiff-wife was injured when a truck hit the restaurant
in which she was working with her husband. She was thrown
against a piece of equipment, thereby injuring her leg. Pain de-
veloped in her leg and neck; a blood clot was discovered in her
leg; she was ordered not to work. Subsequently, a blood clot was
discovered in her breast. She could not work for 6 months, and
she was suffering leg pains 3% years after the accident. Her
husband sued for medical expenses of $1,172.20, loss of wages,
wages paid for a substitute employee, and loss of consortium.
The wife was awarded $6,000 and the husband $3,000. The trial
court ordered a remittitur of $3,000 and $1,000 respectively. The
court based the remittitur on an alleged reference by the plain-
tiff to an "insurance doctor." The judge also stated that the
injuries were slight. The appeals court stated that the trial court
had abused its discretion in ordering a remittitur since the evi-
dence made such an award well within reasonable limits. 32
A 23-year old employee lost both legs in an accident, and an
award of $226,000 was not so flagrantly excessive as to shock the
2s Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P. 2d 1 (1948).
29 Foerster v. Ridder, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (1945).
30 Elliott v. Sherman, 147 Me. 317, 87 A. 2d 504 (1952).
31 Arizona Cotton Oil Co. v. Thompson, 30 Ariz. 204, 245 P. 673 (1926).
32 Stevens v. Edward C. Levy Co., 376 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. 2d 414 (1965).
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conscience of the court, considering the loss and suffering in-
volved. Other cases cited offered meager help in determining if
the present award was excessive because of differences in cir-
cumstances and changes in the value of money.33
A motorist was awarded $23,000 for a concussion, broken
ribs, partial loss of hearing, and a fractured skull which re-
quired the insertion of a steel plate which left an obvious scar.
This amount is not so grossly excessive as to require a remit-
titur.3
4
A plaintiff was struck by a defendant with a shotgun and
suffered a cut elbow, bruised breast and mental suffering. The
jury awarded $2,000 in damages. The appeals court stated that
it would not have made such a high award but the award was
not obviously excessive or produced by passion or prejudice.35
A 44-year old physical education instructor was awarded
$30,000 for a mild, permanent paralysis which affected his gait.
He had $2,500 in expenses before the trial. The court felt that
no passion or prejudice was involved in the verdict, and award-
ing damages is primarily the jury's function. 36
In another case the plaintiff lost his spleen due to a fall; he
had actual expenses of $1,400 and was awarded $18,000. The
court stated that the plaintiff lost a vital organ and for that rea-
son the verdict was not excessive. 37
An award of $75,000 was granted to a child for loss of vision
in one eye, facial damages, a concussion, and a broken clavicle,
all suffered in an auto accident; this award was not excessive.
Life expectancy is a valid consideration in awarding damages,
and also changing economic conditions have a bearing on an
award of damages.38
A $20,000 verdict to a policeman who suffered extensive
injury to his knee which prevented him from returning to work
for 2 years was not excessive. The verdict did not shock the
conscience of the court.39
A plaintiff was injured in a fall from a sidewalk and was
awarded $15,000 in damages. There was conflicting evidence of
33 Hubbard v. Long Island, supra note 7.
34 Wright v. Covey, 233 Ark. 798, 349 S. W. 2d 344 (1961).
35 Bowser v. Bembo, 34 Ohio Law Abst. 253, 36 N. E. 2d 998 (1941).
36 Liby v. Town Club, 5 Ill. App. 2d 559, 126 N. E. 2d 153 (1955).
37 Kleren v. Bowman, 15 Ill. App. 2d 148, 145 N. E. 2d 810 (1957).
38 Lopez v. Price, 145 Conn. 560, 145 A. 2d 127 (1958).
39 McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N. W. 2d 456 (1958).
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her condition. The court stated that conflicts in evidence belong
to the jury to resolve. The amount of the verdict should not be
lowered because there were conflicts in evidence.
40
For older plaintiffs, age is an important factor in determining
the basis for remittitur. A $2,500 award to a 77-year old man
with a 25% limp and insomnia was not excessive. 4' An award of
$6,500 for an injury to the shoulder and arm of a 60-year old
woman was not excessive, but a $25,000 award to a permanently
disabled 86-year old man without income was excessive by
$16,500.42
Conclusion
From the foregoing cases it is evident that the courts exer-
cise wide discretion in applying the principles of remittitur. The
trial court can apply remittitur with greater assurance than the
appeals court and will be reversed only when an abuse of dis-
cretion is shown. Many courts use comparative awards to deter-
mine excessiveness, while others pay little heed to prior awards.
Passion and prejudice require a new trial in some jurisdictions,
while in others it is a basis for remittitur or a new trial. Remit-
titur is based on equitable principles and aims at avoiding ex-
cesses in jury verdicts without having recourse to new trials.
The courts are continually applying remittitur because only
the total damages are listed in many awards and the total some-
times clearly appears to be excessive. If in all cases the award
would show the individual dollar amount of each damage, the
judge and appeals court could study each item and pinpoint the
obvious errors and the exact amount awarded for unliquidated
damages. If the court then found passion and prejudice only
with regard to pain and suffering, that issue would have to be
retried, or remittitur accepted on that item. A second trial
would deal only with the issue not satisfactorily determined in
the initial trial. Issues not really in dispute or already settled
would be eliminated from the new trial, and the jury would have
to deal with only one or two items of damage. By using a break-
down of the damages awarded, future cases would have a better
yardstick for comparing awards and determining what is exces-
40 Dodson v. New England Trust Co., 78 Ohio App. 503, 71 N. E. 2d 503
(1946).
41 Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21, 49 N. E. 2d 970 (1943).
42 Olson v. Siordia, 25 Wis. 2d 274, 130 N. W. 2d 827 (1964).
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sive. A court would not have to waste time in searching for
nearly identical cases to see if all items agreed. Similar cases
would be studied only in regard to the items of pain and suffer-
ing and loss of earning power, which are the really difficult dam-
ages to evaluate.
Extensive use of experts on income planning, to explain to
juries the cost of maintaining an income level over a fixed num-
ber of years, should be encouraged. Sometimes it might be more
equitable to all to have a referee assess the value to put on par-
ticular facts determined by the jury, except for the value for pain
and suffering, which cannot be judged by any existing standards.
Thus the jury would be guided in its evaluation of the "auditor's
findings" in the case, subject to the equitable review of the trial
judge and appeals court.
Courts are using remittitur more and more frequently. This
indicates that the growing complexity of fixing damages requires
a change in emphasis on the duty of the jury as determiners of
fact on one hand, and as awarders of damages on the other. We
need the jury to evaluate the facts, but we often need expert
advice in determining the precise amount of damages.
May, 1966
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